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THE FABLE OF FEDERAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: 
RECONSIDERING THE FEDERAL ROLE 
IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
Jonathan H. Adler† 
INTRODUCTION 
Cleveland was the site of one of the seminal events in environ-
mental history.  On the morning of June 22, 1969, a stray spark ig-
nited oil and debris on the surface of the Cuyahoga River.1  The re-
sulting fire attracted relatively little local attention in Cleveland, but 
became a national event.  Subsequently, Time,2 National Geo-
graphic,3 and The New York Times4 all wrote about the fire.  It even 
inspired a song by Randy Newman.5  By many accounts, it lit the 
spark that led to the passage of the Federal Clean Water Act. 
There are some problems with the traditional story of the Cuya-
hoga River fire, though.  It is a powerful fable of federal environ-
mental history, but a fable nonetheless.  The fire was neither a sign of 
                                                                                                                  
† Associate Professor and Associate Director of the Center for Business Law & Regula-
tion, Case Western Reserve University School of Law.  This essay is based upon a lecture 
delivered at the Case Western Reserve University School of Law on February 11, 2004, spon-
sored by the Nord Family Foundation, the Property & Environment Research Center, and the 
Center for Business Law & Regulation. 
1 This discussion is based upon Jonathan H. Adler, Fables of the Cuyahoga: Reconstruct-
ing a History of Environmental Protection, 14 FORDHAM. ENVTL. L.J. 89 (2002). 
2 The Cities: The Price of Optimism, TIME, Aug. 1, 1969, at 41. 
3 Sad, Soiled Waters: The Cuyahoga River and Lake Erie, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC., Dec. 
1970, at 743-44. 
4 Cleveland River So Dirty It Burns, N.Y. TIMES (dateline June 28, 1969, copy on file 
with National Georgraphic Society).  For whatever reason, this story did not run in all editions 
of the paper and is not available in the New York Times archive.  A copy is on file with the Case 
Western Reserve Law Review.   
5 RANDY NEWMAN, Burn On, on SAIL AWAY (Reprise Records 1972) (“Cleveland, even 
now I can remember/'Cause the Cuyahoga River/Goes smokin' through my dreams/Burn on, big 
river, burn on.”).  See also R.E.M., Cuyahoga, on LIFE’S RICH PAGEANT (EMD/Capitol 1986)  
(“ Underneath the river bed we burned the river down . . . . Cuyahoga, Cuyahoga gone.”). 
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continuing environmental decline, nor clear evidence of the need for 
federal regulation.  By revisiting the fable of the Cuyahoga, this essay 
aims to reconsider the origins of federal environmental regulation, 
and question the presumption that many environmental problems are 
best addressed through federal legislation.  This essay posits that 
many federal environmental laws were adopted for the wrong rea-
sons. Further, it suggests that environmental protections could be im-
proved if more policy decisions were left in the hands of state and 
local governments. 
THE FABLE OF THE CUYAHOGA 
The 1969 fire is among the most infamous events in America’s en-
vironmental history.  Yet the fire was not the inferno most accounts 
presume.6  To the contrary, the fire was notably brief—lasting less 
than 30 minutes and receiving scant coverage in the Cleveland press.  
Time magazine ran a well-known picture of the fire later that year.  
Yet the picture in Time is not the 1969 fire at all.  Rather it is a photo 
of a fire nearly 20 years earlier—a fire that truly was intense, caused 
substantial damage, and dominated the local news.7  Time could not 
run a photo of the fire because no such photo exists.  The closest thing 
to a photo of the 1969 fire portrays a tugboat spraying water on a rail-
road trestle, but there is no smoke, let alone any flame.8  No photog-
rapher arrived in time to actually catch a picture of the fire before it 
was under control, so an older photo was published instead.   
The popular perception is that the 1969 river fire was evidence of 
ever-deteriorating environmental quality.  Most accounts of the fire 
                                                                                                                  
6 For example, former EPA Administrator Carol Browner recalled the fire thusly, “I will 
never forget a photograph of flames, fire, shooting right out of the water in downtown Cleve-
land. It was the summer of 1969 and the Cuyahoga River was burning.”  Quoted in Kristina M. 
Tridico, Sustainable America in the Twenty-First Century: A Critique of President Clinton’s 
Council on Sustainable Development, 14 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 205, 212 n.47 (1998-
99).  Yet as there was no photograph of the 1969 fire, the picture she almost certainly remem-
bers was of the 1952 fire, not the 1969 fire.  This is hardly the only mischaracterization of the 
1969 fire.  One environmental history claims that in 1969 the river burned for eight days!  
RICHARD N. L. ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING OURSELVES: A 
HISTORY OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 224 (1999).  See also ELIZABETH WHELAN, 
TOXIC TERROR 225 (1985) (claiming that “In 1959 [sic] the river burned for eight days, as 
flames fed on hosts of industrial wastes that had been carelessly discharged on a regular basis”).  
For further examples, see Adler, supra note 1, at 89-98. 
7 See, e.g., “1952 Cuyahoga River on Fire,” available at 
 http://www.cwru.edu/artsci/engl/marling/60s/pages/richoux/50sFirePicture.html (last visited 
Oct. 5, 2004).  See also Adler, supra note 1, at 98. 
8 The Cleveland Press could only run a photo of the railroad ties warped by the heat of 
the flames.  The Cuyahoga River Caught Fire, CLEVELAND PRESS, June 23, 1969, at 1 available 
at http://www.cwru.edu/artsci/engl/marling/60s/pages/richoux/69Realphoto.html (last visited 
Oct. 5, 2004) (showing no smoke or fire visible in picture).  See also Oil Slick Fire Damages 2 
River Spans, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, June 23, 1969 at 11-C. 
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suggest water pollution had gotten so bad by 1969 that eventually a 
river burst into flames.  In reality, fires on industrial rivers were rela-
tively common throughout the late-19th and much of the 20th centu-
ries.  In Cleveland’s own history, there were many more notable fires 
than the brief blaze of 1969.  In addition to the aforementioned 1952 
fire shown in Time, there were major fires in 1936 and 1912, and in 
many other years.9  Yet these fires were not covered as prominently 
by the national press. 
The Cuyahoga may be the most famous river to have burned, but it 
was hardly alone.  The Schuylkill, Rouge, and others also burned.10  
By 1969, however, the sort of pollution that led to such fires—the 
accumulation of oil, chemicals, and flammable debris on the water’s 
surface—were largely under control. The Cuyahoga River, for in-
stance, had not burned in 17 years.      
Over time, the fire hazard had become great enough to threaten lo-
cal shipping, prompting the first cleanup efforts on the Cuyahoga.  
Evidence of a clear environmental problem prompted direct local 
action.11  Boats were dispatched to skim debris from the water and 
fire codes were enforced on local industry.12  These efforts were 
largely successful, and the fire threat on the river subsided.  In this 
light, the 1969 fire is best seen as a freak accident.  It merited rela-
tively little local concern, but sparked national attention due to the 
growing national awareness of environmental problems.  The Time 
photo in particular shocked the nation’s emerging environmental con-
sciousness. 
                                                                                                                  
9 See John C. Kuehner, Cuyahoga River’s Fans Begin to See Hope, CLEVELAND PLAIN 
DEALER, Oct. 8, 2004, at A18 (noting the 1969 fire was “at least the 11th fire since 1868”); see 
also Adler, supra note 1, at 99-105. 
10 See Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 427 (1958) (noting tugboat on 
Schuylkill River “caught fire when an open-flame kerosene lamp on the deck of the scow ig-
nited highly flammable vapors lying above an extensive accumulation of petroleum products 
spread over the surface of the river”); United States v. Ashland Oil & Transport Co., 504 F.2d 
1317, 1326 (6th Cir. 1974) (taking judicial notice that the Rouge and Cuyahoga Rivers had 
“repeatedly caught fire”); See also River Afire Rolls Under Baltimore, CLEVELAND PLAIN 
DEALER, June 9, 1926, at 1 (describing the fire on the river leading to Baltimore Harbor); Sig-
nificant Progress on Water Pollution Reported, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1984, at 31 (noting that 
the Buffalo river caught fire in the 1960s).  
11 See, e.g., Demands Burke End Oil Fire Hazard on Cuyahoga River, CLEVELAND 
PRESS, Nov. 3, 1952, at 6 (noting local demand for action to reduce river fire hazard). 
12 See FRANK A. BUTRICO ET AL., RECOMMENDED PROJECTS FOR POLLUTION 
ABATEMENT ON THE LOWER CUYAHOGA RIVER TO THE OHIO WATER DEVELOPMENT 
AUTHORITY 13 (Battelle Memorial Institute, 1968) (noting “[t]he use of containment booms and 
floating mechanical-skimming devices to remove floating oil slicks has been demonstrated”); 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, CONFERENCE IN THE MATTER OF 
POLLUTION OF LAKE ERIE AND ITS TRIBUTARIES, PROCEEDINGS Vol. 4, 837-38 (1965) (citing 
Mayor Locher who noted that the city was opening bids for a contract to remove debris from the 
river). 
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The cleanup of the Cuyahoga began before the 1969 fire drew na-
tional attention.  Local industry and municipal leaders formed the 
Cuyahoga River Basin Water Quality Committee to monitor local 
water quality.13  Then in 1968, local voters approved $100 million to 
finance local cleanup.14  As a fire hazard, the Cuyahoga River was far 
cleaner in 1969 than it had been in decades, just as industrial rivers 
nationwide were less ridden with oils and flammable debris than they 
had been in the past.  As one local official would later reflect, “We 
were already doing the things we needed to clean up things there, and 
then the fire happened.”15  
THE FABLE OF ENVIRONMENTAL DECLINE 
The 1969 fire is generally viewed as evidence of ever-deteriorating 
water quality—if not ever-worsening environmental quality—
nationwide.16  Yet, as noted above, the available evidence suggests 
the Cuyahoga’s water quality was improving in 1969 in many impor-
tant respects.  In this sense the story of the Cuyahoga is actually rep-
resentative of a national trend.  Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, state 
and local governments began to recognize the importance of envi-
ronmental quality and adopted first generation environmental con-
trols.17  As would be expected, some states’ efforts were clearly more 
comprehensive and more successful than others, and different states 
had different priorities.  Environmental protection did not always 
trump health care, education, or other local concerns.  Nonetheless, 
by 1966, every state had adopted water pollution legislation of some 
sort. 
The conventional fable is that federal environmental regulation 
was necessary because states failed to adopt adequate environmental 
measures.  This account ignores the substantial environmental pro-
gress in many areas prior to the enactment of most major federal envi-
ronmental laws.18  The EPA’s first national water quality inventory, 
                                                                                                                  
13 BUTRICO ET AL., supra note 12 at 7. 
14 Voters Win Round 1 of War on Pollution, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 7, 1968, at 
9. 
15 Roger Brown, 1969 River Blaze Scarred Image, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, June 18, 
1989, at 1-B (quoting Ben S. Stefanski II, Public Utilities Director in 1969). 
16 See, e.g., Drew Caputo, A Job Half Finished: The Clean Water Act After 25 Years, 27 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10574, 10576 (1997) (“When the rivers are on fire, you know things are bad.”). 
17 See, e.g., N. William Hines, Nor Any Drop to Drink: Public Regulation of Water Qual-
ity; Part I: State Pollution Control Programs, 52 IOWA L. REV. 186, 234 (1966) (noting that “in 
the majority of states interest in controlling pollution has come alive in the last fifteen years”); 
see also U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WATER POLLUTION ABATEMENT PROGRAM: 
ASSESSMENT OF FEDERAL AND STATE ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS, B-166506 (Mar. 23, 1972), at 
8.  The GAO study was based on a review of six state programs. Id. at 5-6. 
18 See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice 
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conducted just one year after adoption of the Clean Water Act, found 
that there had been substantial improvement in water quality in major 
waterways over the preceding decade, at least with regard to the pol-
lutants of greatest concern at the time: organic waste and bacteria.19  
While water quality problems persisted, the evidence suggests that 
states began addressing those water quality problems that were clearly 
identified and understood well before the federal government.   
There are similar patterns of state and local action preceding fed-
eral regulation in other areas as well.  Federal wetland regulation, for 
example, began after a federal district court decision interpreting the 
Clean Water Act to require such regulation in 1975.20  State and local 
regulation had begun much earlier, however.  Massachusetts became 
the first state to regulate wetland development in 1963, modeling its 
initial efforts on preexisting local rules.21  By 1975, all fourteen states 
in the continental U.S. with more than ten percent of their land area in 
wetlands according to the National Wetland Inventory had adopted 
wetland protection measures.22    This is significant because this pat-
tern of regulation—those states with the most wetland acreage regu-
lating first—is the opposite of that which was predicted. 23  All else 
equal, imposition of wetland regulations in a state in which there is a 
greater proportion of wetlands as a percentage of the state’s total land 
area will impose greater costs than the imposition of similar regula-
tions in a state in which wetlands represent a smaller proportion of its 
land area.  As a result, one would expect such states with more wet-
lands to begin regulating after those states with fewer wetlands, if 
                                                                                                                  
 
Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 578-79 (2001) (“[T]he view widely held in the legal literature 
that the states ignored environmental problems before 1970 is simply not correct.”). 
19 A. Myrick Freeman III, Water Pollution Policy, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 97, 114 (Paul R. Portney ed., 1990) (“The results of the EPA’s 
first National Water Quality Inventory, conducted in 1973, indicated there had been significant 
improvements in most major waterways over the preceding decade, at least in regard to organic 
wastes and bacteria.”). 
20 NRDC v. Callaway, 392 F.Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975); see also United States v. Holland, 
373 F.Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974) (upholding Courts’ jurisdiction over non-navigable waters 
and intertidal wetlands connected to navigable waters).  
21 See Alexandra D. Dawson, Massachusetts' Experience in Regulating Wetlands, in 
WETLAND PROTECTION: STRENGTHENING THE ROLE OF THE STATES 255 (1985). 
22 See JON A. KUSLER ET AL., ASSOCIATION OF STATE WETLAND MANAGERS, STATE 
WETLAND REGULATION: STATUS OF PROGRAMS AND TRENDS, at 5-8, tbl. 1.  The states in 
question are Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Wisconsin. 
23 Oliver A. Houck & Michael Rolland, Federalism in Wetlands Regulation: A Considera-
tion of Delegation of Clean Water Act Section 404 and Related Programs to the States, 54 MD. 
L. REV. 1242, 1253 (1995) (“[T]he larger a state’s wetland inventory, the more important it is to 
the nation, but the less important saving it may appear to be to the state itself—indeed the more 
onerous the burden of protecting it will appear.”). 
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they were to ever regulate at all.  Yet all regulated prior to the federal 
government.24 
The story of air pollution control is similarly a story of state and 
local governments acting first, and the federal government acting 
later.  Cincinnati and Chicago become the first cities to adopt effec-
tive smoke control ordinances in 1881, and the number of cities with 
effective local controls increased dramatically in the post-World War 
II era.25  In some cities, such as Pittsburgh, the business community 
played a leading role in supporting such regulation.26  State regula-
tions followed in much of the country.   
Several studies of air pollution find evidence of significant envi-
ronmental improvement prior to the adoption of federal environ-
mental regulation.  In a comprehensive study of air pollution trends, 
environmental analyst Indur Goklany documents that levels of key 
pollutants were in decline prior to adoption of the 1970 Clean Air Act 
Amendments.27  More significantly, the rate of improvement for some 
pollutants was greater prior to the adoption of federal controls than 
after.28  Robert Crandall of the Brookings Institution found that pre-
federal air pollution control efforts were more successful than is typi-
cally assumed: “[P]ollution reduction was more effective in the 
1960s, before there was a serious federal policy dealing with station-
ary sources, than since the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments.”29  
These studies suggest that state and local governments had the ability 
and motivation to address identified environmental concerns.  As Paul 
Portney of Resources for the Future concluded, “These data . . . call 
into question one of the fundamental premises behind the [Clean Air 
Act]—that states and local governments would never impose the con-
trols necessary to achieve healthful air.”30     
As with water pollution, once a given air pollution problem was 
clearly identified and understood, state and local governments began 
                                                                                                                  
24 For a more extended discussion of the history of state wetland regulation, see Jonathan 
H. Adler, Wetlands, Waterfowl, and the Menace of Mr. Wilson: Commerce Clause Jurispru-
dence and the Limits of Federal Wetland Regulation, 29 ENVTL. L. 1, 41-54 (1999). 
25 See Arthur C. Stern, History of Air Pollution Legislation in the United States, 32 J. AIR 
POLLUTION CONTROL ASS’N 44, 44 (1982).   
26 See ROY LUBOVE, TWENTIETH-CENTURY PITTSBURGH: GOVERNMENT, BUSINESS, AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 106-41 (1969); see also Cliff I. Davidson, Air Pollution in Pitts-
burgh: A Historical Perspective, 29 32 J. AIR POLLUTION CONTROL ASS’N 1035 (1979). 
27 INDUR GOKLANY, CLEARING THE AIR (1999). 
28 This does not necessarily mean that state and local efforts were more effective than fed-
eral efforts, as the observed data could be the result of diminishing marginal returns from pollu-
tion control efforts. 
29 ROBERT W. CRANDALL, CONTROLLING INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION: THE ECONOMICS AND 
POLITICS OF CLEAN AIR 19 (1983). 
30 Paul R. Portney, Air Pollution Policy, PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION 27, 51 (Paul R. Portney ed., 1990). 
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enacting measures to address these concerns before the federal gov-
ernment got into the act.  Indeed, in some cases the early state efforts 
became the model for subsequent federal measures.  In others, federal 
regulations were adopted, with the support of industry, to preempt 
more stringent or less uniform state regulatory standards.31  While it is 
common to suggest that federal intervention was necessary because 
state and local efforts “failed” to protect environmental quality, the 
historical record suggests a more complicated tale.  Prior to the 1970s 
the federal government failed to fulfill many of its preexisting envi-
ronmental obligations.32  At the same time, some state and local gov-
ernments were beginning to make substantial progress in addressing 
local environmental concerns. 
With both air and water pollution, the pollutants of greatest con-
temporary concern were targeted first.  As the nation became wealth-
ier, and the knowledge base improved, attention to environmental 
matters increased.  It is well-established that wealthier societies place 
greater importance on environmental protection.33  They also have 
greater means to protect environmental values.  The work of Indur 
Goklany strongly suggests that once wealthy societies perceive an 
environmental problem, they begin to address it.34  In the United 
States, this is exactly what happened.  And contrary to the common 
fable, in most cases state and local governments were the first to act. 
Why didn’t states act earlier?  In the 1950s, let alone the 1910s or 
1930s, environmental issues did not yet rank with concerns for eco-
nomic development, technological progress, and other social ills.  
There are many things recognized as environmental problems today 
that 30 or 50, let alone 100, years ago were of little social concern.  
An industrial river was often seen as a sign of progress—the prismatic 
                                                                                                                  
31 See E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federaliza-
tion of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 330-33 (1985).   
32 See Adler, Fables, supra note 1, at 129-38. 
33 See RICHARD L. STROUP, ECO-NOMICS: WHAT EVERYONE SHOULD KNOW ABOUT 
ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 13-14 (2003); Bruce Yandle et al., The Environmental 
Kuznets Curve: A Review of Findings, Methods, and Policy Implications, PERC RESEARCH 
STUDY 02-01 (April 2004), available at http://www.perc.org; see also Jason Scott Johnston, On 
the Market for Ecosystem Control, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 129, 146 (2002) (“There is abundant 
evidence that the demand for outdoor recreation and environmental amenities increases with 
national income.”); Kenneth E. McConnell, Income and the Demand for Environmental Quality, 
2 ENVTL. & DEV. ECON. 383, 385-86 (1997) (reporting on empirical evidence on environmental 
Kuznets curve); Matthew E. Kahn & John G. Matsusaka, Demand for Environmental Goods:  
Evidence from Voting Patterns on California Initiatives, 40 L. & ECON. 137 (1997) (noting that 
most environmental goods are normal goods for which demand rises with income); Patrick Low, 
Trade and the Environment:  What Worries the Developing Countries?, 23 ENTVL. L. 705, 706 
(1993) (noting that “the demand for improved environmental quality tends to rise with in-
come”).   
34 GOKLANY, supra note 27, at 4-6. 
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pools of oil and chemicals on the surface of the water were seen as a 
sign of prosperity, not of waste and abuse.35  Policy makers at all lev-
els of government knew little about the health effects of pollution and 
paid it little heed.  While the environmental problems that plagued 
Cleveland and other parts of the nation are obvious in hindsight, the 
nature and extent of these problems were not always readily apparent 
at the time.  Wetlands are appreciated for their tremendous ecological 
value today, but for much of the nation’s history they were deemed 
nuisances, and the federal government subsidized their destruction.36  
Insofar as environmental protection was an item on the public agenda 
before 1969, concern focused on sanitation and drinking water, not 
the recreational or aesthetic values of waterways.  Once the demand 
for greater pollution control emerged, action began. 
The observed pattern of environmental regulation appears to have 
three phases.  First there is a period of perception in which a given 
environmental problem is recognized as such.37  Then, in case after 
case, state and local governments begin to adopt measures to address 
the concern.  This is quite possibly due to the importance of local 
knowledge.38  Those closest to a given environmental resource or 
concern are likely to be the first to recognize that there is a problem.  
As already noted, some of the state and local measures are more ef-
fective than others, and many early protection efforts may not be par-
ticularly effective.  There is a learning curve to environmental protec-
tion as with any other endeavor.  Federal regulation, in each case, 
comes last—after the period of perception and after the initial state 
and local efforts. 
                                                                                                                  
35 See WILLIAM DONOHUE ELLIS, THE CUYAHOGA 157 (1966)  
The Gilded Age began—and it seemed to run on iron and oil, which turned the 
Cuyahoga iron red with an iridescent scum of oilbow colors . . . . There were some in 
carriages going over the bridge who looked down at the red and said it was a shame 
to dirty the river that way.  But those who were right down in the waters in boats and 
barges and scows through the red and the rainbow were the sweetest colors a river 
ever had. 
Id. 
36 See Leovy v. United States, 177 U.S. 621, 636 (1900) (noting that wetlands are “the 
cause of malarial and malignant fevers” and declaring “the police power is never more legiti-
mately exercised than in removing such nuisances” ); Robert E. Beck, The Movement in the 
United States to Restoration and Creation of Wetlands, 34 NAT. RESOURCES J. 781, 781 (1994) 
(noting that the country “was draining everything in sight to make communities healthful . . .” ); 
David E. Gerard, Federal Flood Policies: 150 Years of Environmental Mischief, in 
GOVERNMENT VS. ENVIRONMENT 59 (Donald R. Leal & Roger E. Meiners eds. 2002) (explain-
ing that “[F]ederal flood control policies can be traced back to the mid-nineteenth century when 
land policy promoted the conversion of wetlands . . . to what were considered more productive 
uses”). 
37 GOKLANY, supra note 27, at 3. 
38 See infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text. 
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THE CAUSES OF CENTRALIZATION 
  If neither state or local failure to address environmental concerns 
nor ever-deteriorating environmental quality caused the adoption of 
federal regulation, what did?  I would suggest four factors that played 
a role, although there may be others.39  First, there is little doubt that 
the nation’s environmental consciousness increased dramatically dur-
ing the post-World War II era, particularly in the decade before the 
1969 Cuyahoga fire.  Despite substantial environmental progress in 
many areas, significant environmental problems remained, many of 
which had gone unrecognized for decades.  Throughout the 1960s, 
pressure grew for greater federal involvement in environmental con-
cerns.  As America became more affluent, the demand for environ-
mental quality increased dramatically.  At the same time, best-selling 
books popularized the notion that modern industrial activity posed a 
mortal environmental threat.40 The United States always had a strong 
conservation ethic, but the sort of environmental awareness that we 
think of today is relatively a recent phenomena; it really began in the 
1960s, and culminated in the first Earth Day in 1970 and the passage 
of numerous federal environmental statutes. 
A second factor has to be the nationalization of American poli-
tics—a phenomenon encouraged by the growth of the national media.  
Politics were more nationalized and local events could become stories 
on the national news.41  The Santa Barbara oil spill, the 1969 Cuya-
hoga fire and other environmental events in the 1960s and 1970s be-
came national events because they could be broadcast on a national 
level.  Earlier river fires were not national events, even though they 
caused millions of dollars in damage and killed many people.  Stories, 
and more importantly pictures, of such events were not distributed as 
widely in the first part of the century.  Yet later images of less severe 
environmental harms had a greater effect.  Even if things were im-
proving locally, one could always find a picture in a newsmagazine or 
                                                                                                                  
39 For instance, Professor Farber postulates that federal environmental regulation was the 
result of a confluence of factors that created a “republican moment.” See Daniel A. Farber, 
Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 59, 60 (1992). 
40 See, e.g., RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962) (arguing that the massive use of 
chemical insecticides is devastating the environment); PAUL R. EHRLICH, THE POPULATION 
BOMB (1968) (discussing the ensuing world wide environmental crisis resulting from overpopu-
lation); VANISHING AIR: THE RALPH NADER STUDY GROUP ON AIR POLLUTION (John C. 
Esposito ed., 1970) (documenting the effects of air pollution and arguing that corporate and 
governmental actors are not adequately addressing the problem); DONNELLA H. MEADOWS ET 
AL., THE LIMITS TO GROWTH (1972) (arguing that if the present growth trends in world popula-
tion, industrialization, pollution, food production, and resource depletion continue unchanged, 
the limits to growth will be reached sometime within the next one hundred years).   
41 See Elliot et al., supra note 33, at 335 (attributing some of the increased public concern 
with environmental issues to increased press coverage). 
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on the nightly news to suggest that somewhere else environmental 
conditions were still getting worse.  
Third—and this is particularly important for those who advocate 
federalism and the decentralization of policy-making authority—the 
1960s was a period of time in which the ideas of states rights, federal-
ism, and leaving things at the local level were de-legitimized—
sometimes for good reason.  Federalism and “states rights” were often 
perceived as smokescreens designed to preserve racial segregation 
and frustrate the protection of civil rights—and in many cases this 
perception was accurate.  While there were legitimate constitutional 
principles at stake, the association of federalism and localism with 
racism and segregation de-legitimized these principles for a genera-
tion.  After the civil rights struggle, appeals to state autonomy and 
states rights simply did not have the same rhetorical force they once 
had in American politics.42  So, when the nation sought to address a 
problem, such as environmental degradation, it was much easier to 
call for “progressive” federal involvement to correct the “retrograde” 
actions of the individual states.  If Mississippi couldn’t be trusted to 
protect its citizens, how could it be trusted to protect its land, air, wa-
ter and wildlife?  Without this development, it would have been much 
more difficult to centralize environmental regulation in the hands of 
the federal government. 
A fourth, and often overlooked, factor in the rise of federal envi-
ronmental regulation is rent-seeking.  Economic and regional interests 
realized they had something to gain by shifting environmental policy 
from the state and local level to the federal level, and in some cases 
that was an important, if not pivotal, reason for federal regulation.  
Perhaps the most prominent example of this is the adoption of federal 
vehicle emission standards, which were explicitly designed to pre-
empt the proliferation of more stringent state standards.43  
In the 1960s, as the role of automobiles in urban air pollution be-
came clear, states began to consider adopting tailpipe emissions stan-
                                                                                                                  
42 It is important to note that the conflation with federalism with “states rights” miscon-
strues the nature of the principles at issue.  Federalism, properly understood, is designed to 
protect individual liberty by constraining governmental power.  It is not about protecting “states 
rights.”  See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States’ Rights: A Defense of 
Judicial Review in a Federal System, NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming) (arguing that federalism 
allocates power between the state and federal governments for the benefit of the people of the 
nation, not for the benefit of states qua states). 
43 See Elliott et al., supra note 33, at 326-33 (noting that “the first significant federal stat-
utes regulating air pollution . . . [were passed] because two well-organized industrial  
groups . . . were threatened with a state of affairs even worse from their perspective—namely, 
inconsistent and progressively more stringent environmental laws at the state and local level.”); 
David Schoenbrod, Why States, Not EPA, Should Set Pollution Standards, in ENVIRONMENTAL 
FEDERALISM 260-62 (Terry L. Anderson and P.J. Hill eds. 1997). 
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dards for new vehicles.44  California was the first state to do this.  As 
California had some of the nation’s worst air quality, it was also the 
national leader in developing and adopting air pollution control 
strategies.  This concerned the nation’s automobile manufacturers.  
They were concerned about the stringency and timing of state stan-
dards, as well as with the potential for different states to adopt differ-
ent standards.  The industry was not pro-regulation, as such, but faced 
with the choice between variable and potentially stringent state regu-
lation or a consistent federal standard, they opted for the latter.45  The 
automakers liked the idea that if they made a car in Detroit, it could 
be sold in any state in the union.  They feared that if California 
adopted its standards this year, New York might come along next 
year and adopt a different standard, and Pennsylvania might then 
come along and adopt a third standard, and Florida might adopt a 
fourth standard, and so on.  In the end, automakers would not only 
have to meet a California standard, but potentially a dozen or more.  
This would significantly increase the cost of production for automo-
biles and other nationally marketed products. 
In searching for a solution to this problem, the automakers settled 
on the idea of authorizing federal regulation of automobile emissions 
to preempt more stringent state standards.46  Initially the idea was to 
give this authority to a federal regulatory agency, as this would delay 
the adoption of standards for many years.47  Congress obliged with 
the Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Act of 1965.48  Eventually, Con-
gress adopted federal vehicle emission standards directly into statute 
and grandfathered California’s authority to set its own standards.49   
The origin of federal vehicle emission standards is one story of 
how economic rent-seeking encouraged environmental centralization, 
but it is hardly the only one.50  In the 1977 Clean Air Act regional 
interests fought over standards relating to emissions from coal-fired 
power plants, as well as standards for prevention of significant dete-
                                                                                                                  
44 Elliott et al, supra note 33, at 330. 
45 Id. at 326. 
46 Id. at 331. 
47 Id. at 261. 
48 79 Stat. 992 (1965). 
49 Under current law, states other than California that desire more stringent vehicle emis-
sion controls than are provided under federal law may opt into California’s vehicle emission 
standards, but they may not adopt a “third” standard. 
50 See generally ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS (Michael 
S. Greve & Fred L. Smith, Jr. eds., 1992); POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM: GOING BEHIND THE 
GREEN CURTAIN (Terry L. Anderson, ed., 2000); Todd J. Zywicki, Environmental Externalities 
and Political Externalities: The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73 
TUL. L. REV. 845 (1998-99). 
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rioration.51  The part of the country already burdened by federal envi-
ronmental regulations was very eager to impose equivalent regula-
tions on the rest of the nation, lest they suffer some economic disad-
vantage.52  In areas ranging from the regulation of paint emissions to 
oil tanker standards—areas where different parts of the nation may 
have legitimately different interests—large national corporations tend 
to prefer a single standard that they can comply with everywhere 
rather than dealing with different standards in different places, even if 
the variability of standards has some regional environmental justifica-
tion.53 
By revisiting the origins of federal environmental regulation, we 
can reject the fables that such regulation was necessary because envi-
ronmental conditions were getting progressively worse or because 
state and local governments were unwilling or incapable of protecting 
environmental concerns.  Instead, the historical record suggests four 
factors that, in combination, led to the centralization of environmental 
regulation: 1) Increased awareness of and demand for environmental 
quality; 2) Increased nationalization of politics; 3) State governments’ 
declining political legitimacy; and 4) Rent-seeking by corporations 
and other economic interests.54  As a result, environmental policy has 
been centralized in the hands of Washington, D.C.  The important 
question today is what have been the consequences of this centraliza-
tion. 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF CENTRALIZATION 
The fable of federal environmental regulation is not only that fed-
eral regulation was necessary to address state and local failures.  The 
fable also suggests that federal environmental regulation was a logical 
and effective means of addressing the nation’s environmental prob-
lems.  While there is no doubt some federal measures were effective, 
it is worth reconsidering the record of federal regulation.  The exist-
ing regulatory architecture is three decades old, so it is now possible 
                                                                                                                  
51 See generally, BRUCE ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL, DIRTY AIR: 
OR HOW THE CLEAN AIR ACT BECAME A MULTIBILLION-DOLLAR BAIL-OUT FOR HIGH-SULFUR 
COAL PRODUCERS AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT  (1981) (chronicling the regional 
and economic rent-seeking surrounding the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act and the 
resulting environmental effects). 
52 B. Peter Pashigian, Environmental Regulation: Whose Self-Interests Are Being Pro-
tected?, 23 ECON. INQUIRY. 551 (1985). 
53 Michael S. Greve, Business, the States, and Federalism’s Political Economy, 25 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 895, 903 (2002). 
54 See, e.g., Christopher H. Schroeder, Rational Choice Versus Republican Moment - Ex-
planations for Environmental Laws 1969-73, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 29, 58 (1998) 
(observing that no single factor, in isolation, is the likely cause of the adoption of environmental 
laws). 
 9/3/2004 5:55:54 PM 
2004] FABLE OF FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 105 
to evaluate the effectiveness of federal environmental measures.  
Whether or not existing federal regulations deserve some share of the 
credit for the environmental successes of the past three decades, it is 
increasingly clear that they did not deliver the environmental gains 
that were promised, and will be unable to ensure continued environ-
mental gains into the future.   
Today there is a growing consensus among environmental policy-
makers that environmental regulations must be reformed if environ-
mental progress is to continue.  Existing programs are increasingly 
inefficient and ineffective.  Even those who have no principled objec-
tion to centralized federal regulation believe there is a need for dra-
matic change.  Enterprise for the Environment, a consensus-building 
stakeholder project on environmental reinvention, concluded: “The 
current system, consisting mainly of end-of-pipe, technology-based 
regulations, is inadequate for the challenges ahead.”55  The most re-
cent report on environmental policy from the National Academy of 
Public Administration, Environment.Gov concurred: “The regulatory 
programs in place in this country simply cannot address [current envi-
ronmental] problems at a price America can afford.”56  A top-to-
bottom review of environmental regulation by Resources for the Fu-
ture reached similar conclusions, finding the existing system of pollu-
tion control fragmented and inefficient, overly rigid and unnecessarily 
complex.57  This general critique of existing federal environmental 
programs was even accepted by the Clinton administration’s Rein-
venting Environmental Regulation report:  
Prescriptive regulations can be inflexible, resulting in costly 
actions that defy common sense by requiring greater costs for 
smaller returns. This approach can discourage technological 
innovation that can lower the costs of regulation or achieve 
environmental benefits beyond compliance.58 
The various studies tend to identify a series of problems with our 
current federal government regulations.  They are inflexible, experi-
encing diminishing marginal returns, are poorly prioritized, overly 
                                                                                                                  
55 Karl Hausker, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Only Path to a Sustainable 
Future, 29 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,148, 10,149 (1999).  Participants in the project included represen-
tatives from government, industry, and environmental organizations.  For a list of participants, 
see http://www.csis.org/e4e/particip.html#1. 
56 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, ENVIRONMENT.GOV:  
TRANSFORMING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 11 (2000). 
57 J. CLARENCE DAVIES & JAN MAZUREK, REGULATING POLLUTION: DOES THE U.S. 
SYSTEM WORK? (1997). 
58 William J. Clinton & Albert Gore, Reinventing Environmental Regulation, NAT’L 
PERFORMANCE REV., Mar. 1995, at 2, available at http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS30367. 
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politicized, and poorly suited to the next generation of environmental 
concerns. Nonetheless, environmental regulation continues to in-
crease, making it more difficult to adopt better ways of addressing 
certain problems.   
One source of these pathologies within environmental regulation is 
excessive centralization.  While there is some flexibility for state and 
local government involvement, most of the central policy decisions 
are dictated from Washington, D.C.  For a tremendously heterogene-
ous and variegated country, the nation’s environmental laws largely 
impose a single national approach.  All too often, federal environ-
mental law embodies a “one-size-fits-all” approach that, in practice, is 
“one-size-fits-nobody.”  As Professor Farber has observed, “[f]ederal 
regulations tend to be insensitive to differences in technological and 
economic constraints and to variations in environmental problems.”59  
Even those parts of federal environmental laws that, in theory, ad-
dress regional and local concerns, provide little flexibility in practice.   
Current environmental programs exhibit most of the failings of 
Soviet-style command-and-control systems: rigidity, inefficiency, 
diminishing marginal returns, and poor prioritization.  This may be 
the inevitable consequence of adopting a centralized, command-and-
control regulatory framework to address environmental concerns.  
Federal regulatory agencies are delegated the authority to set envi-
ronmental goals60 and prescribe the methods that may be used for 
their attainment.  As Professor Stewart notes, this approach has be-
come “nothing less than a massive effort at Soviet-style planning of 
the economy to achieve environmental goals” 61  The problem is that 
such ecological central-planning cannot succeed any better than its 
discredited economic cousin.  Indeed, the likelihood of long-term 
success is even less in the environmental context; planning the “pro-
duction” of environmental “goods,” such as air quality, wilderness, or 
whatever else, is orders of magnitude more complex than planning the 
production of shoes or wheat.  Centralized regulatory agencies are ill-
equipped to handle the myriad ecological interactions triggered or 
impacted by private activity.  No doubt the first generation of envi-
                                                                                                                  
59 DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL 
DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 181 (1999). 
60 Most federal environmental statutes specify abstract goals, but it is left to the regulatory 
agencies to delineate the standards or measures that embody the legislatively prescribed princi-
ple.  For example, the Clean Air Act requires localities to achieve air quality levels that are 
“necessary to protect the public health” with an “adequate margin of safety,” but it is the EPA 
that quantifies the pollution levels that correspond to this goal.  See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
7401-7431 (2004). 
61 Richard B. Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks through Economic Incentives, 13 
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 153, 154 (1988). 
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ronmental regulations produced some significant gains—just as the 
Soviet economies once appeared productive. Over time, however, 
every centrally planned economy collapsed under its own weight. As 
centralized environmental regulations reach their limit, they too begin 
to falter.  The excessive centralization of environmental policy in the 
hands of a federal regulatory bureaucracy is the central failing of con-
ventional environmental policy. 
THE CASE FOR DECENTRALIZATION62 
If excessive centralization is the problem, then some measure of 
decentralization is at least a step toward the solution.  Decentralizing 
authority and responsibility for environmental policy has the potential 
to address some of the greatest problems with existing environmental 
regulations as well as to sow the seeds for further, much needed, re-
forms.  Today’s overly centralized, rigid, and inefficient environ-
mental regime fails to take advantage of the potential efficiencies 
inherent in the federalist system.  Transferring significant environ-
mental authority to the states could foster innovation and greater at-
tention to local environmental concerns and conditions, while enhanc-
ing accountability for environmental decisions, particularly where 
environmental concerns are local in nature.  There are several reasons 
for moving toward a more “federalist” environmental policy: regional 
variation, preference satisfaction, knowledge, innovation, account-
ability, and “ecologies of scale.” 
First, the nature of environmental problems will vary from place to 
place.  The air pollution problem in Pima County, Arizona is very 
different from the air pollution problem in Cuyahoga County, Ohio.  
Each urban area has a different mix of pollution sources and geo-
graphical factors that determine the nature of local pollution concerns 
and suggest different sources of solutions.  The most cost-effective 
pollution control measures in a city with a centralized downtown and 
a large, aging industrial base will be different than those in a city that 
is more spread out, has little industry, and where automobiles are 
newer and better maintained than in other cities.  Even if one focuses 
on a single pollutant of concern, such as tropospheric ozone, the mix 
of sources will vary, as will the best control strategies.  Indeed, in 
some cases, policies that will reduce ozone levels in one area will 
actually increase ozone levels in another. 63 
                                                                                                                  
62 This discussion is largely based upon Jonathan H. Adler, Letting Fifty Flowers Bloom: 
Using Federalism to Spur Environmental Innovation, in THE JURISDYNAMICS OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: CHANGE AND THE PRAGMATIC VOICE IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW 263, 265-66 (Jim Chen ed., 2003). 
63 See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RETHINKING THE OZONE PROBLEM IN 
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Second, while it may be fair to say that all Americans are “envi-
ronmentalists”—in that all Americans generally support the goals of 
cleaner air and water, protection of natural areas, and the like—
specific environmental preferences vary from place to place.  In some 
parts of the country, the greatest environmental concern may be 
drinking water, in another it may be the preservation waterfowl habi-
tat.  Environmental goals that may seem unobjectionable may be op-
posed in some parts of the country where citizens would rather devote 
public resources to other concerns.64  Whether it is worth investing 
additional public resources to reduce a cancer risk from 0.8 in a mil-
lion to 0.7 in a million is a question of values that science cannot an-
swer, and it is unreasonable to assume that there will be a national 
consensus as to the proper trade-off for the attainment of marginal 
increments of environmental protection. 
Decentralized decision-making allows for a closer fit between 
policies and local preferences and gives individuals the option to sort 
themselves among jurisdictions based on which offers the most ap-
pealing mix of policies and amenities.  As a result, more people 
would be satisfied with the priorities and policies under which they 
live.65  Another consequence of decentralization, of course, is greater 
diversity in policy offerings.  A decentralized approach to environ-
mental policy would necessarily be a more varied one.66  “One-size-
fits-all” approaches tend not to fit any area particularly well.  There-
fore, allowing for policy variation increases the likelihood that envi-
ronmental controls in a given area will match local needs and con-
cerns.  
Third, centralized regulatory systems are unable to accumulate and 
incorporate all of the time- and place-specific information and knowl-
edge necessary to design optimal environmental policies.  As Profes-
sor Stewart noted over twenty-five years ago, “environmental quality 
involves too many intricate, geographically variegated physical and 
institutional interrelations to be dictated from Washington.”67   This is 
the “knowledge problem” described by Nobel Laureate economist 
F.A. Hayek: 
                                                                                                                  
 
URBAN AND REGIONAL AIR POLLUTION 12 (1992). 
64 See Nebraska v. EPA, 331 F.3d 995 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (discussing a state challenge to the 
federal drinking water standard for arsenic). 
65 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1494 (1987). 
66 See Marc K. Landy, Local Government and Environmental Policy, in DILEMMAS OF 
SCALE IN AMERICA’S FEDERAL DEMOCRACY 233 (M. Derthick, ed., 1999).  
67 Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?: Problems of Federalism in Mandating 
State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1266 (1977). 
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[T]he knowledge of the circumstances of which we must 
make use never exists in concentrated or integrated form, but 
solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently con-
tradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals pos-
sess.  The economic problem of society is thus not merely a 
problem of how to allocate “given” resources—if “given” is 
taken to mean given to a single mind which deliberately 
solves the problem set by these “data.”  It is rather a problem 
of how to secure the best use of resources known to any of 
the members of society, for ends whose relative importance 
only these individuals know.  Or, to put it briefly, it is a prob-
lem of the utilization of knowledge not given to anyone in its 
totality.68 
This “knowledge problem” is greatly magnified in the environmental 
context because of the inherent complexity of environmental con-
cerns.  Planning for environmental protection encompasses all the 
intricacy and specialized information required for economic planning 
on top of the need for scientific and technical expertise and site-
specific information related to particular environmental concerns.  
The local and regional nature of many environmental problems means 
that familiarity with local conditions is necessary to develop proper 
solutions. Such localized knowledge is simply beyond the reach of 
even the most intrepid federal regulators. As Professors Butler and 
Macey observe, “[f]ederal regulators never have been and never will 
be able to acquire and assimilate the enormous amount of information 
necessary to make optimal regulatory judgments that reflect the tech-
nical requirements of particular locations and pollution sources.”69 
Fourth, greater decentralization allows for greater innovation and 
can spur the development of new approaches to environmental protec-
tion.  As Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis noted in 1932, “[i]t is 
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single coura-
geous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try 
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the 
                                                                                                                  
68 F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 519-20 (1945).  
Hayek later elaborated on this point, noting that  
[t]he chief reason why we cannot hope by central direction to achieve anything like 
the efficiency in the use of resources which the market makes possible is that the 
economic order of any large society rests on a utilization of the knowledge of par-
ticular circumstances widely dispersed among thousands of individuals.   
F.A. Hayek, The New Confusion About Planning, in NEW STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, 
ECONOMICS AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 232, 236 (1978). 
69 HENRY N. BUTLER & JONATHAN R. MACEY, USING FEDERALISM TO IMPROVE 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 27 (1996). 
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country.”70  Decentralization permits states and communities to de-
velop new approaches that address emerging environmental concerns, 
incorporate local concerns, or attain environmental goals at lower 
cost.  Interjurisdictional competition is a key element in this process, 
as the prospect of competition from other states encourages jurisdic-
tions to find new ways of maximizing their appeal.71  
At present we already see many states trying to experiment with 
better ways of achieving environmental goals.  These experiments 
range from financial incentives for conservation measures and non-
point source pollution controls to expedited or more flexible permit-
ting systems and brownfield redevelopment programs.72  As occurred 
in the debate over the federal welfare system, state experimentation 
and innovation can pave the way for greater reforms.  Indeed, when 
the federal government innovates, it is often replicating successful 
state efforts.73  At the same time, as Professor Farber notes, policy 
failures “are nearly as important, since observing them may save us 
from making costly errors on a national scale.”74  Despite current state 
and local efforts, there is relatively little experimentation and innova-
tion in environmental policy today because existing federal environ-
mental statutes severely limit state opportunities to innovate and ex-
periment.75 
Fifth, decentralization can increase accountability within environ-
mental policy.  When policies are nationalized, addressing the con-
cerns of those communities that suffer disproportionately from policy 
errors or omissions becomes difficult.76  Local environmental con-
cerns must compete against national political priorities.  A Congress-
man from Washington state voting on a statute that is driven by the 
environmental problems faced by Los Angeles, California does not 
bear the costs, nor reap the benefits, of the policy at issue.  A small 
town that needs to devote resources to improving the quality of its 
                                                                                                                  
70 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
71 See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 
(1956).  Interjurisdictional competition also provides a check on rent-seeking policies at the state 
level.  See Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving 
Federalism and Economic Development, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (1995). 
72 For various examples of state-level innovation, see Environmental Council of the 
States, at http://www.sso.org/ecos/publications/oldinno.htm; Alexander Volokh et al., Race to 
the Top: The Innovative Face of State Environmental Management, POLICY STUDY 239 (Reason 
Public Policy Institute, February 1998). 
73 See Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contempo-
rary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1148, 1172 (1995) (“Some of the most innovative environ-
mental protection legislation has been the product of state initiatives.”). 
74 DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL 
DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 183 (1999). 
75 Adler, supra note 64, at 270-72.  
76 Schoenbrod, supra note 45, at 264-65. 
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drinking water must compete for federal funds and attention with 
whatever environmental concern is on the evening news.  The local 
politician who supports a local drinking water ordinance drinks the 
water protected by the law and is part of the taxbase that will support 
the policy at issue.  As Professors Butler and Macey observe, 
“[a]llocation to local governments of regulatory authority over local 
externalities allows decisions to be made by the representatives of the 
citizens who benefit the most and pay the most for higher environ-
mental quality.”77  If local residents are dissatisfied with the balance 
struck by their own elected representatives and regulatory officials, 
they have the ability to seek redress.  Their freedom to alter environ-
mental policies to fit their needs will be less subject to those who do 
not share the costs and benefits of the policy decision or understand 
local values and concerns.  
Sixth, there are ecologies of scale in environmental policy. 78  Most 
environmental problems are local and regional in nature, and there are 
some that may be global or international, but none are “national.”  As 
a result, state and local governments often have a comparative advan-
tage in addressing most environmental concerns.  Concerns for local-
ized knowledge, innovation, accountability, and satisfying prefer-
ences counsel greater decentralization.  The federal government may 
well enjoy a comparative advantage in the funding and support of 
scientific research, but this does not necessarily extend to policy 
choice and design. 
At one time it could perhaps be argued that states lacked the re-
sources to address environmental problems, and therefore an over-
arching federal presence was required.  Today, however, states play 
the dominant role in implementing environmental policies, even if 
they are relegated to a marginal role in priority setting and the ad-
ministration of environmental policy.  While federal environmental 
enforcement efforts get most of the attention, most environmental 
enforcement and monitoring is done at the state level.79  State agen-
cies are not perfect—and there will be failures at the state and local 
level just as sure as there will be failures at the federal EPA.  None-
                                                                                                                  
77 BUTLER & MACEY, supra note 71, at 7. 
78 BUTLER & MACEY, supra note 71, at 27 (“[W]hatever the economies of scale associated 
with the centralization of environmental policy, they are surely overwhelmed by the disecono-
mies of scale in centralized administration.”). 
79 See, e.g. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO), EPA’S AND STATES’ EFFORTS TO 
FOCUS STATE ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS ON RESULTS 16 (1998) (GAO/RCED-98-113) (report-
ing that states accounted for 85 percent of enforcement actions in 1996); see also David L. 
Markell, The Role of Deterrence-Based Enforcement in a “Reinvented” State/Federal Relation-
ship: The Divide Between Theory and Reality, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 32 (2000) (noting 
that states are responsible for vast majority of inspections and enforcement nationwide). 
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theless, state and local agencies will always be closer to many of the 
environmental problems we seek to address.   
THE WAY FORWARD 
The argument for decentralization is not an argument for eliminat-
ing the federal role in environmental protection.  Rather, it is an ar-
gument for redefining the federal-state balance.  Specifically, the fed-
eral government should focus its efforts where the federal government 
has a comparative advantage over state and local governments.  This 
is not the case in designing and implementing drinking water stan-
dards or improving urban air quality.  It is, however, the case when it 
comes to interstate pollution.  Where pollution from one state spills 
over into another state, there is an unimpeachable case for federal 
intervention.80  Yet there are relatively few provisions of federal envi-
ronmental law that specifically address such spillover concerns—and 
what few provisions exist have been rarely invoked. 81   
It is also important for the federal government to clarify the extent 
of its current role.  In 2001, the Supreme Court held that some regula-
tions under the Clean Water Act governing isolated waters and wet-
lands exceed federal authority,82 yet it left the precise contours of 
existing federal authority unclear.83  This uncertainty discourages 
states from filling the gaps, as they do not know how much of a gap 
there is to fill.  State governments are not likely to squander scarce 
                                                                                                                  
80 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J. 
931 (1997).  Merrill, an advocate of federalism, notes that “[g]iven the inherent difficulties in 
regulation by any single state, transboundary pollution would seem to present a clear case for 
shifting regulatory authority from local to more centralized levels of governance.”  See also, 
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resources duplicating federal regulations, so the lack of clear bounda-
ries on federal regulation may be resulting in lower levels of envi-
ronmental protection.  
More importantly, the federal government needs to create clear 
and legally defined opportunities for state and local experimentation.  
A policy of “ecological forbearance,” under which state governments 
could seek relief from existing federal mandates so as to experiment 
with alternative means of environmental protection could reopen the 
laboratories of democracy in environmental policy.84  This is not an 
argument for simply scrapping the regulatory structure that exists 
today.  Rather, it is a call for facilitating greater innovation and evolu-
tion in environmental policy by creating opportunities for policy 
change.   
Finally, it is important to note that there is no such thing as achiev-
ing environmental nirvana.  Modern human civilization inevitably 
entails environmental impact. The question is not which policy ap-
proach or mix of policies will eliminate all environmental problems.  
Rather, the question is what mix of institutions and policies will do 
the best—or perhaps the least-bad—job of helping us reach the envi-
ronmental goals that we seek to attain.  Every approach is going to 
have problems; every approach that we point to is going to fail at 
some point.  So the answer to the question will simply be the ap-
proach that does the most acceptable job.  
It is in some senses an historical accident that state leadership in 
environmental policy was supplanted by federal regulation, and envi-
ronmental policy could be improved if states regained more of their 
historic role.  The federal government did not come to dominate envi-
ronmental policy because a more decentralized system was leading to 
environmental ruin.  Rather, an accidental spark on the Cuyahoga 
River helped ignite the political push for national regulation — a push 
that was then furthered by other factors within the political process.  
Recognizing the fables of federal environmental regulation, and de-
centralizing control over environmental policy, could restore a more 
healthy and productive balance in environmental policy.  A more de-
centralized approach would not only be more efficient, but also more 
effective and equitable as well. 
                                                                                                                  
84 A proposal for “ecological forbearance” is outlined in Adler, supra note 64, at 272-81. 
